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THE CENTRE FOR TAX SYSTEM INTEGRITY 
WORKING PAPERS 
 
The Centre for Tax System Integrity (CTSI) is a specialised research unit set up as a 
partnership between the Australian National University (ANU) and the Australian Taxation 
Office (Tax Office) to extend our understanding of how and why cooperation and 
contestation occur within the tax system.  
 
This series of working papers is designed to bring the research of the Centre for Tax System 
Integrity to as wide an audience as possible and to promote discussion among researchers, 
academics and practitioners both nationally and internationally on taxation compliance. 
 
The working papers are selected with three criteria in mind: (1) to share knowledge, 
experience and preliminary findings from research projects; (2) to provide an outlet for 
policy focused research and discussion papers; and (3) to give ready access to previews of 
papers destined for publication in academic journals, edited collections, or research 
monographs. 
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Abstract 
 
Why citizens pay their taxes voluntarily is an important question for tax administrations 
worldwide. Some believe it is because taxpayers are deterred from tax evasion out of a fear 
of being caught or penalised. Others, in contrast, suggest that factors such as the level of 
tax morale one has (that is, the intrinsic motivation one has to pay their tax) affects 
compliance behaviour. While there have been numerous empirical studies published that 
have explored the role of deterrence on tax compliance behaviour, very few studies have 
explored the concept of tax morale in any detail. This study therefore attempts to rectify 
this gap in the literature. If tax morale is important in determining compliance behaviour, 
as several researchers have suggested, then it is also important to understand what might 
affect one’s level of tax morale. The specific aim of this paper will be to identify factors 
that shape or have an impact on tax morale. Using data collected from the Australian wave 
of the 1981 and 1995 World Values Survey, this study will demonstrate that factors such as 
trust and moral beliefs play an important role in shaping tax morale in Australia. Further, it 
will be shown that tax morale has increased significantly in Australia since the early 1980s, 
and that it has done so at a faster rate than many other OECD countries. Possible 
explanations for this increase will be discussed. 
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Tax morale in Australia: What shapes it and has it changed over time? 
 
Benno Torgler1 and Kristina Murphy 
 
I. Introduction 
 
Why do some people pay their taxes while others do not? This question has received 
increased attention in the tax compliance literature over the past few decades, and a 
number of theories have been offered in an attempt to answer the question. For example, 
based on an expected utility argument, rational choice theorists have posited that people 
weigh up the costs and benefits of complying with the law and will disobey it if the 
anticipated penalties or probability of being caught are lower than the gains that could be 
experienced through non-compliance. In line with this economics-of-crime approach, 
Allingham and Sandmo (1972) presented a formal economic model showing that the extent 
of tax evasion was negatively correlated with the probability of detection and the degree of 
punishment. Many economists have since taken Allingham and Sandmo’s findings to 
suggest that a deterrence policy should be used to ‘enforce’ taxpayers to obey the law. In 
other words, they believe that harsh sanctions and penalties should be used to deter people 
from breaking the law. 
 
The problem with the deterrence view, however, is that many empirical and experimental 
findings show that these deterrence models predict too little tax evasion (for review see 
Torgler 2001a, 2001b, 2002). In fact, in many countries the level of deterrence is too low 
to explain the high degree of tax compliance (Dhami & al-Nowaihi, 2004). Take, for 
example, the issue of tax compliance in Australia. The tax system in Australia is based 
largely on self-assessment and voluntary compliance by taxpayers. The probability of 
receiving an audit from the Australian Taxation Office (Tax Office) is low. The chance of 
being caught avoiding tax is also, on the balance of probabilities, unlikely, and if a 
taxpayer is caught, the culpability penalties are relatively minor when compared to the 
potential for economic gain. Yet it has been found that the majority of Australian taxpayers 
still comply with their obligations and pay their taxes with good will (Braithwaite, 2003).  
                                                 
1 Andrew Young School of Policy Studies, International Studies Program, USA; University of Basel, 
Wirtschaftswissenschaftliches Zentrum (WWZ), Basel (Switzerland) and CREMA Center for Research in 
Economics, Management and the Arts (Switzerland). 
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Furthermore, international research has also shown that there is a big gap between the 
amount of risk aversion that is required to guarantee such high compliance rates and the 
actual reported degree of risk aversion in the community, which has been found to be much 
lower (for the United States see Smith & Kinsey, 1987; Graetz & Wilde 1985; and Alm, 
McClelland & Schulze, 1992; for Switzerland see Frey & Feld, 2002). In addition, tax 
compliance experiments mostly report higher levels of income declaration than the 
expected utility model would predict (see Torgler 2002). Findings such as these suggest 
that there is more to tax compliance behaviour than the rational choice theorists would 
have us believe.  
 
Some researchers have argued that tax morale—the intrinsic motivation one has to pay 
their tax—can help to explain the high degree of tax compliance observed in many 
countries (for example, Schwartz & Orleans, 1967; Lewis, 1982; Roth, Scholz & Witte, 
1989; Alm et al., 1992, 1999; Pommerehne, Hart & Frey, 1994; Pommerehne & Weck-
Hannemann, 1996; Frey, 1997, 2003; Frey & Feld, 2002; Feld & Tyran, 2002). Before 
proceeding any further, it may first be of benefit to briefly discuss how tax morale has been 
defined in the past and how it might relate to other concepts such as taxpayer ethics. As 
indicated above, the most standard definition given in the tax morale literature is that tax 
morale is basically the intrinsic motivation one feels to pay their taxes. This appears to be 
as far as most researchers go in defining the concept and it is generally up to the reader to 
discern what the concept means. It appears from reading the tax morale literature, however, 
that tax morale is very closely linked to what some other authors refer to as tax ethics. As 
noted by Jackson and Milliron (1986, p. 136), concepts such as these are ‘nebulous 
concepts to define’. If we are to accept that these two concepts are very closely related, 
Song and Yarborough (1978) define taxpayer ethics as ‘the norms of behaviour governing 
citizens as taxpayers in their relationship with the government’ (p. 444). So in other words, 
tax morale can generally be understood to describe the moral principles or values 
individuals hold about paying their tax. This will be how tax morale is defined and used in 
the present article. 
 
If tax morale is thought to be an explanation for why tax compliance rates are so high, it 
would be of interest to analyse what may shape tax morale among taxpayers. Surprisingly, 
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however, there is very little evidence available on this topic. Feld and Tyran (2002, p. 199), 
for example, argue:  
 
All in all, too little is known about which motivations of citizens shape tax morale. 
 
Similarly, Feld and Frey (2002) point out that: 
 
Most studies treat ‘tax morale’ as a black box without discussing or even 
considering how it might arise or how it might be maintained. It is usually 
perceived as being part of the meta-preferences of taxpayers and used as the 
residuum in the analysis capturing unknown influences to tax evasion. The more 
interesting question then is which factors shape the emergence and maintenance of 
tax morale (pp. 88-89). 
 
Thus, the analysis of tax morale as a variable of interest (that is, the dependent variable) is 
rather novel in the tax compliance literature (for exceptions, see Torgler 2003a, 2003b, in 
press). If tax morale is important in determining compliance levels, then it is also important 
to understand what might affect one’s level of tax morale. One of the purposes of this 
paper, therefore, is to identify factors that may have an impact on tax morale. It aims to do 
so in the Australian tax context.  
 
Australia is a particularly interesting country to analyse because there have been a number 
of major changes that have occurred to its tax system over the past 20 years. The most 
notable examples have been the introduction of the self-assessment system in 1986 and the 
introduction of the Goods and Services Tax in 2000. Accompanying some of these changes 
has been an increase in the complexity of the tax legislation and the slow movement away 
from command and control enforcement strategies used by the Tax Office to progressively 
more cooperative and customer focused strategies. Whether major changes such as these 
have served to increase or decrease tax morale is the focus of the present study.  
 
The study analyses a cross-section of individuals throughout Australia using the World 
Values Survey data of 1981 and 1995. Working with two datasets collected at two different 
points in time allows us to observe trends over time and it also allows us to assess the 
robustness of our main variables. The findings from these data suggest that tax morale has 
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in fact increased over time in Australia. Furthermore, it will be shown that variables such 
as trust have a positive effect on tax morale. Before considering these findings in detail, 
however, Section II of the paper first aims to outline some of the earlier research into tax 
morale. Section III then provides some information about the World Values Survey, with 
attention being given to the main variables used in the analysis. Section IV presents the 
empirical findings, Section V discusses why tax morale may have increased in Australia 
from 1981 to 1995 and Section VI finishes with some concluding remarks. 
 
II. Tax morale: A brief overview 
 
When analysing Swiss tax culture more than 100 years ago, Georg von Schanz (1890) 
stressed the relevance of taking taxpayers as partners in the tax contract between the state 
and its citizens (for an overview see Feld, 2003). Sixty years later, German scholars 
associated with Günter Schmölders (1951/1952, 1960, 1962, 1970)—the ‘Cologne school 
of tax psychology’—conducted surveys and tried to measure tax morale among taxpayers. 
They tried to lay the bridge between economics and social psychology, emphasising that 
economic phenomena should not only be analysed from the traditional point of view. They 
saw tax morale as an important and integral attitude that was related to tax non-compliance 
(see, Schmölders, 1960). For example, Schmölders (1960) analysed tax morale among self-
employed workers in Europe. He found that self-employed taxpayers had lower levels of 
tax morale than taxpayers who worked for other people or organisations. Strümpel (1969) 
also analysed tax morale among European taxpayers. He conducted an international 
comparative survey in Europe, which compared the tax systems between the various 
European countries, as well as the level of tax morale among each country’s taxpayers. In 
that study, Strümpel found that tax morale in Germany was comparatively low, whereas in 
England it was comparatively high. He went on to suggest that the major difference 
between the German and English tax systems at the time was that the German government 
made use of coercive tax enforcement techniques, while the English system treated 
taxpayers with more respect and less control. Strümpel argued that the enforcement 
strategies used by the Germans served to alienate the public, which went on to negatively 
influence their level of tax morale. He suggested that the English system, in contrast, 
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helped to cultivate tax morale (although he did note that such a system might have offered 
easy opportunities for avoidance and evasion).  
 
While a large amount of preliminary tax morale research was conducted during the 1950s 
and 1960s by the ‘Cologne school of tax psychology’, since that time the concept of tax 
morale has largely been neglected by tax researchers. A number of contemporary tax 
compliance scholars have mentioned the concept of tax morale in their papers or books (for 
example, Lewis, 1982; Vogel, 1974), but only a select few have examined tax morale in 
any detail (see for example, Torgler, 2001a; 2003a; 2003b; in press).  
 
When assessing what factors affected tax morale among Latin American countries, Torgler 
(in press) found that trust in government officials, trust in others obeying the law, and 
numerous demographic variables predicted citizens’ level of tax morale. Torgler (in press) 
also found that the level of tax morale was associated with the degree of tax avoidance in 
each country. For all countries examined, tax avoidance levels and the size of the cash 
economy were lower among countries that had higher levels of tax morale.  
 
In another article, Torgler (2001a) discussed in more detail three key factors that he 
believed were important for understanding tax morale. These were (a) moral rules and 
sentiments (for example, norms, and guilt), (b) fairness, and (c) the relationship between 
taxpayer and government. Even with Torgler’s work, however, recent empirical research 
into tax morale has been almost non-existent in the tax compliance literature. With the 
recent availability of new international datasets, the opportunity has therefore arisen for tax 
researchers to expand upon previous works, to further explore the issues and factors that 
may shape tax morale, and to examine the level of tax morale in many different countries 
around the world. As mentioned earlier, the present study uses data from the 1981 and 
1995 World Values Survey to examine tax morale in Australia. Tax morale levels in 
Australia will be compared to those of 20 other OECD countries for the purpose of 
examining trends in tax morale over time. The paper also attempts to explore what factors 
may shape tax morale in Australia. In doing so, it will be the first time that tax morale has 
been examined empirically in Australia.  
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III. The World Values Survey and some of its measures 
 
3.1. The survey 
 
The data used in the present study came from the 1981 and 1995 World Values Survey. 
The World Values Survey is a worldwide investigation of socio-cultural and political 
change. These surveys have assessed the basic values and beliefs of people around the 
world and have been carried out in about 80 societies representing over 80 per cent of the 
world’s population. The World Values Survey was first carried out in 1981-83, with 
subsequent surveys being carried out in 1990-91, 1995-96 and 1999-20012. Data from 
these surveys are made publicly available for use by researchers interested in how views 
change with time. The World Values Surveys have produced evidence of gradual but 
pervasive changes in what people value, what their beliefs are, and what they want out of 
life. The findings suggest that these changes have an important impact on human behaviour 
and social life. For example, the surveys have pointed to the conclusion that 
intergenerational changes are taking place in basic values relating to politics, economic 
life, religion, gender roles, family norms and sexual norms (see 
www.worldvaluessurvey.com).  
 
For researchers who conduct and administer the World Values Survey in their respective 
country, it is a requirement that they follow the methodological requirements of the World 
Values Association. For example, surveys in the World Values Survey set are generally 
based on national representative samples of at least 1000 individuals 18 years and over 
(although sometimes people under the age of 18 participate). The samples are required to 
be selected using probability random methods, and the questions contained within the 
surveys generally do not deviate far from the original official questionnaire (for a sample 
of a typical World Values Survey see www.worldvaluessurvey.org). In the original 1981 
wave of the Australian survey, a total of 1228 Australian citizens agreed to participate in 
the study. This was followed by a total of 2048 Australians agreeing to participate in the 
1995 survey. 
                                                 
2 Data from the 1999-2001 wave is not as yet available for public analysis or use. 
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3.2. Model and variables 
 
Using data from both the 1981 and 1995 Australian World Values Surveys, our main 
models for predicting tax morale in Australia have the following structure: 
 
 iiiiiii RELTRCTLytTM   543210   (1) 
 
iijiiii RELTRCTLytTM   543210   (2) 
 
where TMi denotes the individual degree of tax morale.  
 
3.2.1 Dependent variable 
 
The dependent variable in the present study is TAX MORALE (TMi). The general question 
to assess level of tax morale from the World Values Survey—and for which has been used 
in previous research—was: 
 
Please tell me for each of the following statements whether you think it can always 
be justified, never be justified, or something in between:  
 Cheating on taxes if you have the chance (answers to be given on a ten point 
scale 1 = ‘never justifiable’ to 10 = ‘always justifiable’). 
 
Given very few respondents would circle the numbers 4-10 on the original scale, it was 
decided here that the TAX MORALE variable should be recoded. The resulting TAX 
MORALE3 variable was developed by reversing and recoding the ten-point scale into a 
four-point scale (that is, 0 = ‘always justifiable’ to 3 = ‘never justifiable’; original scores of 
4-10 were recoded into 0 = ‘always justifiable’)4.  
 
                                                 
3 Some may criticize the way in which tax morale is measured here, as only one question has been used to 
measure the concept. However, in order to be consistent with previously published research it was decided 
that this item would be appropriate and sufficient to measure tax morale among Australians. Furthermore, 
when discussing the concept of taxpayer ethics—a concept very similar to tax morale—Jackson and Milliron 
(1986, p. 137) suggested that specific and individual ethical measures are probably more fruitful than 
aggregated measures. They based this suggestion on the finding of Lewis (1979) who failed to find a general 
factor of tax ethics. 
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3.2.2 Independent variables 
 
As discussed earlier, Torgler (2001a) suggested that there were a number of key factors 
that seemed to be important for understanding tax morale. Two of these factors included 
the relationship taxpayers had with their government (that is, whether they trusted them), 
and taxpayers’ moral rules and sentiments. As part of his empirical research, Torgler (in 
press) confirmed that these concepts predicted levels of tax morale in Latin America. In 
order to see whether these variables were important in understanding tax morale in 
Australia, three questions that most closely measured these concepts were chosen from the 
Australian World Values Survey and used as predictors of tax morale.  
 
Two core variables were used to explore the relationship taxpayers had with authority. One 
of the variables was TRUST IN THE LEGAL SYSTEM (TRi). This variable was measured 
in the World Values Survey as follows:  
 
 Could you tell me how much confidence you have in the legal system: is it a 
great deal of confidence, quite a lot of confidence, not very much 
confidence or none at all? (1 = ‘none at all’ to 4 = ‘a great deal’).  
 
The other variable used to explore the relationship taxpayers had with authority was 
TRUST IN THE PARLIAMENT (TRj). This variable was measured in the World Values 
Survey as follows: 
 
 Could you tell me how much confidence you have in the Parliament: is it a 
great deal of confidence, quite a lot of confidence, not very much 
confidence or none at all? (1 = ‘none at all’ to 4 = ‘a great deal’).  
 
These two variables allow us to analyse trust at the constitutional level (for example, trust 
in the legal system), thereby focusing on how the relationship between the state and its 
citizens is established, and also allow us to analyse trust more closely at the current 
politico-economic level (for example, trust in the parliament). 
                                                                                                                                                    
4 This scale was reversed scored so that it was consistent with the scoring formats of other questions used in 
  9
The relationship between taxpayers and the state can be seen as a relational contract or 
psychological contract, which involves strong emotional ties and loyalties. Such a 
psychological tax contract can be maintained by positive actions that are based on trust. If 
the state is seen to be acting in a trustworthy manner, taxpayers might be more willing to 
comply with their tax obligations. In fact, empirical evidence collected in the tax arena 
appears to support this claim. For example, Scholz and Lubell (1998) found that if 
American taxpayers trusted government or other citizens they were more likely to comply 
with their tax obligations than taxpayers who did not trust. Likewise, using survey data 
collected from Australian taxpayers involved in a long-standing dispute with the Tax 
Office, Murphy (in press) found that if taxpayers did not trust the Tax Office they were 
more likely to resist complying with their rules and decisions. These findings seem to 
indicate that trust is an important institution, which influences citizens’ incentives to 
commit themselves to obedience. If this is indeed the case, one would therefore expect that 
those who have more trust in the legal system or in parliament might also have higher 
levels of tax morale. 
 
RELIGIOSITY (RELi) was an additional independent variable that was analysed in the 
present study. In his earlier research into tax morale, Torgler (2001a) argued that moral 
sentiments were important for understanding tax morale. There are many behavioural 
norms and moral constraints that are strongly influenced by religious motivations. Previous 
empirical studies published in the criminology literature, for example, have shown that 
states and countries with higher rates of religious membership have significantly lower 
violent and non-violent crime (see Hull, 2000; Hull & Bold, 1989; Lipford, McCormick & 
Tollison, 1993). Thus, it might also be the case that religious beliefs might influence 
people’s habits in the area of white-collar crime. For example, religion might be found to 
be a restriction to engaging in tax evasion. Based on this assertion, it is therefore 
hypothesized that Australians who think of themselves as religious might be more likely to 
have higher levels of tax morale than those who do not consider themselves to be religious.  
 
 
                                                                                                                                                    
the study. For example, negative responses to a question will all be denoted with smaller numbers.  
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In order to measure religiosity in the present study, the following question was taken from 
the World Values Survey5: 
 
 Independently of whether you go to church or not, would you say you are: 
1. A convinced atheist 
2. Not a religious person 
3. A religious person 
 
Earlier research into tax morale has also shown that a person’s economic situation can 
affect their level of tax morale. Two proxies of a person’s economic situation—TAX 
RATE (ti) and INCOME (yi)—were therefore used as predictors of tax morale in the 
present analysis. The effects of tax rate and income level on tax evasion are difficult to 
assess theoretically, and often the findings have been mixed (see Jackson & Milliron, 
1986). The findings have also been found to depend on an individual’s risk preference and 
the progression of the income tax schedule (Andreoni, Erard & Feinstein, 1998). A higher 
marginal tax rate makes tax evasion somewhat more profitable, but a contrary effect works 
depending on the risk aversion of taxpayers; tax evasion has also been found to be 
influenced by the type of tax schedule adopted by an administration (that is, whether it is 
proportional, progressive, or regressive) (see Frey & Feld, 2002). 
 
The 1995 World Values Survey data also allowed us to use another proxy for a person’s 
economic situation. An additional question in the 1995 survey asked participants where 
they classified themselves in relation to SOCIAL CLASS (that is, lower class, working 
class, lower middle class, upper middle class, upper class).  
 
In addition to the main independent variables discussed above (that is, ‘trust variables’, 
‘religiosity’, and ‘economic situation’ variables), a number of additional independent 
variables were also used as controls (CTL) to more fully explore what factors might shape 
tax morale. Each of these is listed below. 
 
                                                 
5 This variable was taken and used as a continuous variable in the analyses. 
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AGE: Tittle (1980) argues that older people are more sensitive to the threat of sanctions 
(both social and financial) and research has consistently found that older taxpayers are 
more compliant (Jackson & Milliron, 1986; Wearing & Headey, 1997). It has been 
suggested that this is because over the years older people have acquired more material 
goods, have obtained greater status in their community, and have a stronger dependency on 
the reactions from others (Tittle, 1980). Hence, the potential costs of sanctions increase for 
this group. Whether this sensitivity to sanction threat among older taxpayers also affects 
level of tax morale is tested here. Instead of using age as a continuous variable, four age 
categories were formed: 16-29, 30-49, 50-64, and 65+, with the 16-29 age group being the 
reference group. 
 
GENDER: Do women have different levels of tax morale than men? Social psychological 
research suggests that women are more compliant and less self-reliant than men (for 
example, Tittle, 1980). Based on this past research, we would therefore expect that women 
should also have higher levels of tax morale than men.  
 
MARITAL STATUS: Marital status might influence legal or illegal behaviour depending 
on the extent to which individuals are constrained by their social networks (see Tittle, 
1980). It has been argued by some that married people are more compliant than others 
because they are more constrained. Thus, we would predict that individuals with stronger 
social networks (for example, such as married people) would have higher tax morale than 
singles.  
 
EDUCATION: The effect of education on tax morale is not clear at all. It could be 
reasonably assumed that educated taxpayers are more likely to know more about tax law 
and fiscal connections than uneducated taxpayers, and as a result are better aware of the 
benefits and services the state provides for citizens. But this assumption cannot be 
automatically accepted. If it were to be true, however, one might expect that educated 
taxpayers would be more compliant with their tax obligations (see Lewis, 1982). On the 
other hand, educated taxpayers may be less compliant because they better understand 
opportunities for evasion and avoidance and might be more critical about and better aware 
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of how the state uses tax revenues. Thus far there has been almost no research conducted 
that examines the effect of education on a taxpayers’ level of tax morale. 
 
OCCUPATION STATUS: Does occupational status influence tax morale? The standard 
argument is that self-employed taxpayers evade more taxes. Lewis (1982) argues that self-
employed persons have higher compliance costs so taxes therefore become more visible to 
them. Furthermore, tax evasion might depend on the opportunity to evade or avoid taxes. 
Those taxpayers who are self-employed would have more opportunity to evade their taxes 
than taxpayers who have their taxes deducted each payday by their employers. In a 
European study conducted by Schmölders (1960), it was found that self-employed 
taxpayers had lower levels of tax morale than taxpayers who worked for other people or 
organisations. From this, we would therefore predict that self-employed Australians would 
have a lower level of tax morale than those employed by others. It should be noted, 
however, that the 1981 World Values Survey data did not contain a question that assessed 
self-employment status, so differences between self-employed workers and others could 
not be assessed. To test the hypothesis that self-employed Australians have lower levels of 
tax morale, we therefore had to rely on the 1995 data. 
 
Additional variables could have been taken from the World Values Survey and included in 
the present analysis. However, one of the aims of this paper was to provide a partial 
replication of previous research into tax morale. As a result, the tested variables have been 
limited to those discussed above. 
 
IV. Empirical results 
 
4.1 Multivariate analysis 
 
In all estimations presented here, the determinants of tax morale are analysed with ordered 
probit models. Ordered probit analysis was chosen because ordered probit models help to 
analyse the ranking information of the scaled dependent variable tax morale (Kennedy, 
1998). It should also be noted that as equations have a nonlinear form in ordered probit 
estimation, only the sign of the coefficient can be directly interpreted and not its size. 
Calculating the marginal effects for each coefficent is therefore a method that can be used 
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to find the quantitative effect a variable has on tax morale. Marginal effects indicate the 
change in the share of taxpayers (or the probability of) belonging to a specific tax morale 
level, when the independent variable increases by one unit. 
 
Further, in order to check the reliability and robustness of the independent variables used, 
we also chose to estimate a variety of models in our analysis (see Tables 1a, 1b, 2a, 2b, 3a, 
and 3b). This was done by varying the variables that were entered into each model. In 
some models, some of the independent variables were included, and in others they were 
excluded. Even with these variations, however, it will be seen that the same findings and 
conclusions can be drawn across all models.  
 
4.1.1 1981 data 
 
So what effect do our independent variables of choice have on Australian’s level of tax 
morale? We first present the empirical evidence for the 1981 data. Table 1a and Table 1b 
indicate that trust in the legal system has a positive impact on tax morale. An increase in 
the ‘trust in the legal system’ scale by one unit raises the share of individuals stating that 
tax evasion is never justifiable by more than nine percentage points (see marginal effects). 
Further, in all models tested, trust in the parliament can also be seen to have a positive 
impact on tax morale. An increase in the ‘trust in the parliament’ scale by one unit raised 
the share of individuals stating that tax evasion is never justifiable by more than 6 
percentage points6. So in other words, we observe a reliable and significant relationship 
between trust and tax morale. The implication of these findings in particular, is that 
governments and regulators may find it worthwhile to nurture trust among those they 
regulate (see Braithwaite & Levi, 1998; Murphy, in press). By doing so, they will be able 
to develop stronger relationships with those they regulate. As the results of the present 
study demonstrate, if there are higher levels of trust in authority then tax morale benefits 
positively. 
 
                                                 
6 In all the estimations in this paper we have not included ‘trust in the legal system’ and ‘trust in the 
parliament’ in the same model. This is because there is a strong correlation between the variables that makes 
it impossible to clearly separate the effects of the two variables if they were included in one model. Nor have 
we included ‘income’ or an ‘individual’s tax rate’ in the same model for the same reasons. 
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It was also found that the more religious one is the higher their level of tax morale (see the 
high marginal effects between 11 and 12 percentage points for each level of religiosity). 
This finding therefore supports the claim made earlier that religiosity does affect tax 
morale in a positive way. Looking at the effect of a person’s economic situation on tax 
morale we can see that individual tax rates have a negative effect on tax morale—those 
who are subjected to higher tax rates have lower levels of tax morale—although this effect 
was not statistically significant. Similarly, income level is negatively correlated with tax 
morale—those earning more income have lower levels of tax morale. Again, however, this 
effect was not statistically significant.  
 
It can also be seen from Table 1a and Table 1b that some of the demographic control 
variables have an effect on tax morale. In all models tested, age has a positive impact on 
tax morale. All age groups from 30 to 65+ have significantly higher tax morale than the 
16-29 year old reference group. For example, the proportion of people of the age 30-49 
who report the highest level of tax morale (that is, that have a maximum score of 3) is 
around 12 percentage points higher than for the 16-29 reference age group. In fact, we can 
see that the marginal effects increase with an increase in age; the 65+ age group, for 
example, reports the highest tax morale of all age groups (see marginal effects). Table 1a 
and Table 1b also show that being a woman rather than a man increases the probability of a 
person stating that tax evasion is never justified by more than 14 percentage points. Hence, 
Australian women have significantly higher levels of tax morale than Australian men. No 
significant effects were found for either the marital or employment status variables in any 
of the eight models tested.  
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Table 1a: Ordered probit analysis showing predictors of tax morale in Australia in 1981 
 
Weighted ordered probit 
Model  
1A   
Model 
1B 
  Model  
2A   
Model 
2B 
  
Independent Variables Coeff. z-Stat. Marg. Coeff. z-Stat. Marg. Coeff. z-Stat. Marg. Coeff. z-Stat. Marg. 
a) Tax Rate             
INDIV. TAX RATE             
b) Demographic Factors             
AGE 30-49 0.31*** 3.25 0.12 
 
0.32***
 
3.42 
 
0.13 0.29*** 2.98 0.11 
 
0.30*** 
 
3.17 
 
0.12 
AGE 50-64 0.52*** 4.33 0.21 
 
0.57***
 
4.73 
 
0.23 0.46*** 3.79 0.19 
 
0.51*** 
 
4.17 
 
0.20 
AGE 65+ 1.02*** 5.09 0.41 
 
1.04***
 
5.23 
 
0.41 0.97*** 4.85 0.39 
 
0.99*** 
 
4.96 
 
0.40 
 
GENDER (women) 0.37*** 3.61 0.15 
 
0.42***
 
4.02 
 
0.17 0.36*** 3.38 0.14 
 
0.40*** 
 
3.76 
 
0.16 
 
c) Marital Status             
MARRIED 0.00 0.04 0.00 
 
-0.01 
 
-0.12 
 
-0.01 -0.01 -0.10 -0.01 
 
-0.03 
 
-0.27 
 
-0.01 
LIVING TOGETHER -0.33 -1.40 -0.13 
 
-0.38 
 
-1.54 
 
-0.15 -0.27 -1.15 -0.11 
 
-0.32 
 
-1.30 
 
-0.13 
DIVORCED 0.19 0.85 0.08 
 
0.10 
 
0.46 
 
0.04 0.19 0.83 0.07 
 
0.10 
 
0.45 
 
0.04 
SEPARATED -0.25 -0.81 -0.10 
 
-0.29 
 
-0.96 
 
-0.12 -0.20 -0.64 -0.08 
 
-0.24 
 
-0.78 
 
-0.10 
WIDOWED 0.09 0.40 0.04 
 
0.11 
 
0.49 
 
0.05 0.07 0.29 0.03 
 
0.09 
 
0.39 
 
0.04 
 
d) Economic Variable             
INCOME             
 
e) Occupation Status             
 
PART-TIME EMPLOYED 0.08 0.60 0.03 0.08 0.55 0.03 0.06 0.46 0.03 0.06 0.40 0.02 
AT HOME 0.08 0.61 0.03 0.05 0.39 0.02 0.01 0.04 0.00 -0.01 -0.08 -0.00 
UNEMPLOYED 0.05 0.38 0.02 
 
0.04 
 
0.28 
 
0.01 0.12 0.82 0.05 
 
0.09 
 
0.61 
 
0.03 
STUDENT -0.00 -0.02 -0.00 
 
-0.00 
 
-0.00 
 
0.00 0.08 0.39 0.03 
 
0.08 
 
0.44 
 
0.03 
RETIRED 0.23 1.23 0.093 
 
0.19 
 
0.99 
 
0.07 0.20 1.04 0.08 
 
0.14 
 
0.77 
 
0.06 
 
f) Trust              
TRUST IN LEGAL 
SYSTEM 0.24*** 4.64 0.09    0.24*** 4.57 0.09    
TRUST IN 
PARLIAMENT    
 
0.15***
 
3.06 
 
0.06    
 
0.14*** 
 
2.85 
 
0.06 
g) Religiosity             
RELIGIOUS       0.27*** 4.11 0.11 
 
0.27*** 
 
4.22 
 
0.11 
             
Observations 1103   1103   1083   1083   
Prob(LM-statistic) 0.00   0.00   0.00   0.00   
Notes: Dependent variable: tax morale on a four-point scale. The reference groups for each category of 
independent variable are: AGE 16-29, MEN, SINGLE, and FULL-TIME EMPLOYED. Significance levels: 
* 0.05 < p < 0.10, ** 0.01< p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Marginal effect = highest tax morale score (3). Coefficients 
are standardised. 
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Table 1b: Ordered probit analysis continued showing predictors of tax morale in 1981 
Notes: Dependent variable: tax morale on a four-point scale. The reference groups for each category of 
independent variable are: AGE 16-29, MEN, SINGLE, and FULL-TIME EMPLOYED. Significance levels: 
* 0.05 < p < 0.10, ** 0.01< p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Marginal effect = highest tax morale score (3). Coefficients 
are standardised. 
 
Weighted ordered probit 
Model  
3A   
Model  
3B   
Model  
4A   
Model  
4B   
Independent Variables Coeff. z-Stat. Marg. Coeff. z-Stat. Marg. Coeff. Marg. z-Stat. Coeff. z-Stat. Marg. 
a) Tax Rate             
INDIV. TAX RATE -0.28 -0.41 -0.11 
 
-0.37 
 
-0.54 
 
-0.15       
 
b) Demographic Factors             
AGE 30-49 0.30*** 2.72 0.12 
 
0.31*** 
 
2.87 
 
0.13 0.30*** 0.118 2.715 
 
0.31*** 
 
2.87 
 
0.12 
AGE 50-64 0.44*** 2.92 0.18 
 
0.50*** 
 
3.30 
 
0.20 0.44*** 0.177 2.92 
 
0.50*** 
 
3.30 
 
0.20 
AGE 65+ 1.07*** 4.44 0.43 
 
1.10*** 
 
4.49 
 
0.44 1.07*** 0.428 4.448 
 
1.10*** 
 
4.50 
 
0.44 
 
GENDER (women) 0.41*** 3.17 0.17 
 
0.48*** 
 
3.64 
 
0.19 0.41*** 0.165 3.17 
 
0.48*** 
 
3.64 
 
0.19 
 
c) Marital Status             
MARRIED 0.07 0.46 0.03 
 
0.04 
 
0.31 
 
0.02 0.07 0.03 0.46 
 
0.04 
 
0.32 
 
0.02 
LIVING TOGETHER -0.06 -0.21 -0.02 
 
-0.15 
 
-0.53 
 
-0.06 -0.06 -0.02 -0.21 
 
-0.15 
 
-0.53 
 
-0.06 
DIVORCED 0.23 0.83 0.09 
 
0.18 
 
0.65 
 
0.07 0.23 0.09 0.84 
 
0.18 
 
0.65 
 
0.07 
SEPARATED -0.15 -0.37 -0.06 
 
-0.23 
 
-0.57 
 
-0.09 -0.15 -0.06 -0.36 
 
-0.23 
 
-0.56 
 
-0.09 
WIDOWED -0.13 -0.43 -0.05 
 
-0.14 
 
-0.50 
 
-0.06 -0.13 -0.05 -0.43 
 
-0.14 
 
-0.50 
 
-0.06 
 
d) Economic Variable             
INCOME       -0.01 -0.00 -0.39 
 
-0.01 
 
-0.55 
 
-0.01 
 
e) Occupation Status             
 
PART-TIME 
EMPLOYED 0.11 0.59 0.04 
 
0.10 
 
0.53 
 
0.04 0.11 0.04 0.59 
 
0.10 
 
0.52 
 
0.04 
AT HOME -0.12 -0.66 -0.04 -0.13 -0.77 -0.05 -0.11 -0.04 -0.66 -0.13 -0.77 -0.05 
UNEMPLOYED 0.02 0.12 0.01 
 
-0.04 
 
-0.21 
 
-0.01 0.02 0.01 0.12 
 
-0.04 
 
-0.22 
 
-0.02 
STUDENT 0.09 0.39 0.04 
 
0.11 
 
0.47 
 
0.04 0.09 0.04 0.39 
 
0.11 
 
0.47 
 
0.04 
RETIRED 0.10 0.43 0.04 
 
0.01 
 
0.02 
 
0.00 0.10 0.04 0.44 
 
0.00 
 
0.02 
 
0.00 
 
f) Trust              
TRUST IN LEGAL 
SYSTEM 0.25*** 4.07 0.10    0.25*** 0.10 4.07    
TRUST IN 
PARLIAMENT    
 
0.18*** 
 
3.00 
 
0.07    
 
0.18*** 
 
3.00 
 
0.07 
g) Religiosity             
RELIGIOUS 0.31*** 3.97 0.12 
 
0.31*** 
 
3.97 
 
0.12 0.31*** 0.12 3.97 
 
0.31*** 
 
3.97 
 
0.12 
             
Observations 777   778   777   778   
Prob(LM-statistic) 0.00   0.00   0.00   0.00   
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4.1.2 1995 data 
 
Table 2a and Table 2b present the findings for the 1995 World Values Survey data. The 
1995 data allowed us to incorporate some additional variables into the analysis (for 
example, ECONOMIC CLASS and EDUCATION). As can be seen in Table 2a and Table 
2b, the findings very closely mirror those of 1981, indicating that some predictors of tax 
morale might be stable over time. For example, higher trust in the legal system and higher 
trust in the parliament in 1981 corresponded to higher levels of tax morale. This was also 
the case for the 1995 data. Similarly, those who indicated they were more religious also 
had higher levels of tax morale in 1995. It can also be seen from Table 2a and Table 2b 
that an individual’s tax rates are negatively related to tax morale (that is, those who were 
subjected to higher tax rates tended to have lower tax morale). The relationship, however, 
was not significant. Again, this finding is similar to the 1981 data.  
 
When analysing the economic situation variables, it can also be seen that the ‘income’ 
variable has a negative effect on tax morale, although this variable was not found to be 
significant. Those who considered themselves to be of low economic status (that is, the 
reference group) were also found to have the lowest level of tax morale when compared to 
other class groups (this finding is indicated by the positive coefficients for the higher 
economic class groups). This variable, however, was not found to be a reliable predictor of 
tax morale.  
 
When considering the effects of the control variables, like in the 1981 data there is a 
tendency for age to have a positive impact on tax morale—older Australians have higher 
tax morale. However, the coefficients in Models 7 and 8 of Table 2b show that the positive 
effects of age diminish when the variables TAX RATE or INCOME are included the 
analysis. Like in the 1981 data, women also report higher levels of tax morale than men. 
Unlike in the 1981 data, marital status appears to have an effect on tax morale in 1995. 
Compared to single people, those who are married have significantly higher levels of tax 
morale, thus supporting one of our hypotheses. It was also found that widowed and 
separated Australians had significantly higher levels of tax morale than single Australians.  
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Table 2a: Ordered probit analysis showing predictors of tax morale in Australia in 1995 
 
 
Weighted ordered probit 
Model  
5A     
Model  
5B 
  Model  
6A     
Model  
6B 
 
Independent Variables Coeff. z-Stat. Marg. Coeff. z-Stat. Marg. Coeff. z-Stat. Marg. Coeff. z-Stat. Marg.
a) Tax Rate             
INDIV. TAX RATE             
b) Demographic Factors    
 
 
 
 
 
    
 
 
 
 
 
 
AGE 30-49 0.15* 1.83 0.05 
 
0.12 
 
1.50 
 
0.05 0.14* 1.73 0.05 
 
0.11 
 
1.38 
 
0.04 
AGE 50-64 0.24** 2.23 0.09 
 
0.23** 
 
2.17 
 
0.09 0.17 1.61 0.07 
 
0.16 
 
1.51 
 
0.06 
AGE 65+ 0.39*** 2.64 0.14 
 
0.35** 
 
2.35 
 
0.13 0.32** 2.18 0.12 
 
0.28* 
 
1.87 
 
0.10 
 
GENDER (women) 0.25*** 3.93 0.09 
 
0.25*** 
 
4.02 
 
0.09 0.21*** 3.33 0.08 
 
0.22*** 
 
3.42 
 
0.08 
 
EDUCATION -0.01 -0.68 -0.00 
 
-0.01 
 
-0.39 
 
-0.00 -0.01 -0.63 -0.00 
 
-0.01 
 
-0.36 
 
-0.00 
c) Marital Status    
 
 
 
 
 
       
MARRIED 0.32*** 3.91 0.12 
 
0.31*** 
 
3.75 
 
0.12 0.32*** 3.82 0.12 
 
0.31*** 
 
3.66 
 
0.12 
LIVING TOGETHER -0.16 -1.50 -0.06 
 
-0.16 
 
-1.53 
 
-0.06 -0.17 -1.57 -0.06 
 
-0.17 
 
-1.59 
 
-0.06 
DIVORCED 0.08 0.58 0.03 
 
0.05 
 
0.38 
 
0.02 0.09 0.65 0.03 
 
0.06 
 
0.47 
 
0.02 
SEPARATED 0.30* 1.86 0.11 
 
0.28* 
 
1.74 
 
0.10 0.29** 1.76 0.11 
 
0.26 
 
1.63 
 
0.10 
WIDOWED 0.45*** 2.74 0.17 
 
0.51*** 
 
3.00 
 
0.19 0.45*** 2.76 0.17 
 
0.52*** 
 
3.00 
 
0.19 
d) Economic Variables             
 
UPPER CLASS 0.50 1.09 0.19 0.59 1.33 0.22 0.49 1.01 0.18 0.57 1.22 0.21 
 
UPPER MIDDLE CLASS 0.26 1.32 0.10 
 
0.32* 
 
1.72 
 
0.12 0.25 1.27 0.09 
 
0.30 
 
1.64 
 
0.11 
 
LOWER MIDDLE CLASS 0.17 0.87 0.06 
 
0.23 
 
1.27 
 
0.08 0.15 0.80 0.06 
 
0.21 
 
1.17 
 
0.08 
 
WORKING CLASS 0.16 0.87 0.06 
 
0.24 
 
1.34 
 
0.09 0.17 0.92 0.07 
 
0.24 
 
1.38 
 
0.09 
 
INCOME    
 
 
 
 
 
    
 
 
 
 
 
 
e) Occupational Status    
 
 
 
 
 
    
 
 
 
 
 
 
PART TIME EMPLOYED -0.02 -0.19 -0.01 
 
-0.02 
 
-0.17 
 
-0.01 0.01 0.06 0.00 
 
0.01 
 
0.06 
 
0.00 
SELF-EMPLOYED 0.06 0.38 0.02 
 
0.05 
 
0.35 
 
0.02 0.03 0.23 0.01 
 
0.03 
 
0.22 
 
0.01 
AT HOME 0.17 1.55 0.06 
 
0.20* 
 
1.92 
 
0.08 0.16 1.44 0.06 
 
0.19* 
 
1.80 
 
0.07 
STUDENT 0.07 0.42 0.02 
 
0.06 
 
0.37 
 
0.02 0.02 0.09 0.01 
 
0.01 
 
0.04 
 
0.00 
RETIRED 0.24** 2.16 0.09 
 
0.25** 
 
2.27 
 
0.09 0.26** 2.33 0.10 
 
0.27** 
 
2.43 
 
0.10 
OTHER 0.10 0.76 0.04 
 
0.15 
 
1.08 
 
0.06 0.08 0.60 0.03 
 
0.13 
 
0.96 
 
0.05 
f) Trust              
TRUST IN LEGAL SYSTEM 0.09** 2.28 0.03    0.09** 2.21 0.03    
TRUST IN PARLIAMENT    
 
0.07* 
 
1.75 
 
0.03    
 
0.07* 
 
1.90 
 
0.03 
g) Religiosity             
RELIGIOUS       0.16*** 3.45 0.06 
 
0.17*** 
 
3.51 
 
0.06 
             
Observations 1810   1807   1783   1779   
Prob(LM-statistic) 0.00   0.00   0.00   0.00   
Notes: Dependent variable: tax morale on a four-point scale. The reference groups for each category of 
independent variable are: AGE 16-29, MEN, SINGLE, FULL-TIME EMPLOYED, and LOWER CLASS. 
Significance levels: * 0.05 < p < 0.10, ** 0.01< p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Marginal effect = highest tax morale 
score (3). Coefficients are standardised. 
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Table 2b: Ordered probit analysis continued showing predictors of tax morale in 1995 
 
 
Weighted ordered probit 
Model  
7A     
Model 
7B 
  Model  
8A     
Model  
8B 
  
Independent Variables Coeff. z-Stat. Marg. Coeff. z-Stat. Marg. Coeff. z-Stat. Marg. Coeff. z-Stat. Marg. 
a) Tax Rate             
INDIV. TAX RATE -0.70 -1.44 -0.26 
 
-0.88* 
 
-1.85 
 
-0.33    
   
b) Demographic Factors             
AGE 30-49 0.12 1.41 0.05 
 
0.10 
 
1.23 
 
0.04 0.12 1.46 0.05 
 
0.10 
 
1.14 
 
0.04 
AGE 50-64 0.14 1.21 0.05 
 
0.15 
 
1.34 
 
0.06 0.16 1.46 0.06 
 
0.15 
 
1.32 
 
0.06 
AGE 65+ 0.27* 1.73 0.10 
 
0.26 
 
1.70 
 
0.10 0.31** 2.04 0.11 
 
0.26 
 
1.68 
 
0.10 
 
GENDER (women) 0.21*** 3.13 0.08 
 
0.20***
 
3.02 
 
0.08 0.20*** 3.06 0.08 
 
0.20 
 
3.03 
 
0.07 
 
EDUCATION -0.01 -0.69 -0.01 
 
0.00 
 
0.02 
 
0.00 -0.01 -0.46 -0.00 
 
-0.00 
 
-0.04 
 
0.00 
c) Marital Status             
MARRIED 0.38*** 4.23 0.14 
 
0.35***
 
4.00 
 
0.13 0.35*** 4.06 0.13 
 
0.34*** 
 
3.94 
 
0.13 
LIVING TOGETHER -0.09 -0.81 -0.03 
 
-0.10 
 
-0.91 
 
-0.04 -0.09 -0.86 -0.03 
 
-0.10 
 
-0.90 
 
-0.04 
DIVORCED 0.09 0.66 0.03 
 
0.05 
 
0.39 
 
0.02 0.08 0.62 0.03 
 
0.06 
 
0.43 
 
0.02 
SEPARATED 0.41** 2.36 0.15 
 
0.38** 
 
2.20 
 
0.14 0.40** 2.34 0.15 
 
0.37** 
 
2.18 
 
0.14 
WIDOWED 0.47*** 2.77 0.17 
 
0.11 
 
0.35 
 
0.04 0.43*** 2.68 0.16 
 
0.50*** 
 
2.93 
 
0.19 
d) Economic Variables             
UPPER CLASS 1.17 
 
1.51 
 
0.44 
 
0.03 0.23 0.01 
   
   
UPPER MIDDLE CLASS 
0.31 1.53 0.12 
 
-0.10 
 
-0.88 
 
-0.04    
   
LOWER MIDDLE CLASS 
0.18 0.93 0.07 
 
-0.04 
 
-0.34 
 
-0.01    
   
WORKING CLASS 
0.23 1.19 0.09 
 
0.50***
 
2.91 
 
0.19    
   
 
INCOME    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.02 
 
-1.25 
 
-0.01 
 
-0.02 
 
-1.37 
 
-0.01 
e) Occupational Status    
 
 
 
 
 
    
 
 
 
 
 
 
PART TIME EMPLOYED 0.06 0.54 0.02 
 
0.06 
 
0.65 
 
0.02 0.07 0.77 0.03 
 
0.08 
 
0.79 
 
0.03 
SELF-EMPLOYED 0.07 0.44 0.02 
 
0.05 
 
0.32 
 
0.02 0.07 0.49 0.03 
 
0.06 
 
0.41 
 
0.02 
AT HOME 0.15 1.30 0.06 
 
0.17 
 
1.55 
 
0.07 0.16 1.41 0.06 
 
0.18* 
 
1.65 
 
0.07 
STUDENT -0.00 -0.02 -0.00 
 
-0.05 
 
-0.29 
 
-0.02 0.01 0.04 0.00 
 
-0.01 
 
-0.07 
 
-0.01 
RETIRED 0.23* 1.91 0.08 
 
0.21* 
 
1.77 
 
0.08 0.20* 1.74 0.08 
 
0.23* 
 
1.92 
 
0.08 
OTHER 0.14 1.02 0.05 
 
0.17 
 
1.19 
 
0.06 0.15 1.08 0.06 
 
0.19 
 
1.32 
 
0.07 
f) Trust              
TRUST IN LEGAL SYSTEM 0.08* 1.86 0.03    0.08* 1.91 0.03    
TRUST IN PARLIAMENT    
 
0.06 
 
1.65 
 
0.02    
 
0.07* 
 
1.69 
 
0.02 
g) Religiosity             
RELIGIOUS 0.16*** 3.20 0.06 
 
0.15***
 
3.15 
 
0.06 0.14*** 2.98 0.05 
 
0.15 
 
3.16 
 
0.06 
             
Observations 1623   1684   1687   1684   
Prob(LM-statistic) 0.00   0.00   0.00   0.00   
Notes: Dependent variable: tax morale on a four-point scale. The reference groups for each category of 
independent variable are: AGE 16-29, MEN, SINGLE, FULL-TIME EMPLOYED, and LOWER CLASS. 
Significance levels: * 0.05 < p < 0.10, ** 0.01< p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Marginal effect = highest tax morale 
score (3). Coefficients are standardised. 
 
  20
When considering employment status in 1995, retired people and those keeping house 
appeared to show significantly higher levels of tax morale. Unlike in previous international 
research, there was no effect of self-employment status in the present study. Finally, there 
was no effect of education on tax morale. 
 
4.1.3 Has tax morale changed over time in Australia? 
 
Thus far, we have discussed the findings of the Australian wave of the 1981 and 1995 
World Values Survey independently. We have found that many of the variables that have 
been found to predict and shape tax morale among Europeans and Latin Americans (see 
Torgler, 2001a; in press) have also been found to predict and shape tax morale among 
Australians. For example, like in the international research, trust in government institutions 
(for example, Parliament, legal system) has been found to predict tax morale levels in 
Australia. A person’s moral beliefs have also been shown to predict tax morale. Finally, a 
number of demographic variables were found to predict tax morale among Australians.  
 
What we have not shown so far, however, is whether tax morale in Australia has changed 
substantially over time. Has tax morale increased between 1981 and 1995, or has it 
decreased over this time period? Is this also the case for Australia? Figure 1 presents a 
histogram that details the distribution of tax morale scores in Australia for both 1981 and 
1995. As discussed in the methodology section, those scoring higher on the tax morale 
scale have a higher intrinsic motivation to pay their taxes (that is, believe they should pay 
their taxes).  
 
From Figure 1 it can be seen that there is a difference between the two time periods. 
Contrary to expectation, it appears that tax morale in Australia has actually increased 
between 1981 and 1995. In 1995, 62 per cent of the respondents thought that tax evasion 
was never justifiable, compared to 48 per cent in 1981. Furthermore, when compared to 
responses in 1981, it can also be seen that fewer Australians in 1995 believed evading tax 
was always justifiable (from 34 per cent in 1981 to 17 per cent in 1995). These findings are 
promising as they suggest that Australians’ level of tax morale has in fact increased over 
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time. The belief that people should pay their taxes appears to have become stronger in 
Australia since the early 1980s. 
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Figure 1: Distribution of tax morale scores in Australia for both the 1981 and 1995 
World Values Surveys 
 
In order to assess whether the change in tax morale between 1981 and 1995 has been a 
significant change, statistical analyses were conducted on the data. An ordered probit 
analysis was again used, ensuring that a number of key variables were controlled for. A 
TIME dummy variable was created, with 1981 being the reference group in which to check 
for possible differences across time. In order to compensate for the fact that the number of 
participants in the 1995 data set was much larger than for the 1981 dataset, the observations 
were weighted to get an equal number of observations for each year7. The findings are 
presented in Table 3a and Table 3b.  
                                                 
7 This was done by taking the original weight variable, and multiplying it by a constant for each survey. If the 
data were not weighted it could have produced biases in the pooled analysis. 
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Table 3a: Ordered probit analysis exploring changes in tax morale between 1981 & 1995 
 
 Weighted ordered probit 
Model 
9   
Model 
10   
Model 
11   
Independent Variables Coeff. z-Stat. Marg. Coeff. z-Stat. Marg. Coeff. z-Stat. Marg. 
a) Tax Rate          
INDIV. TAX RATE     -0.00 -0.015 -0.00    
b) Demographic Factors          
AGE 30-49 0.24*** 4.61 0.10 0.25*** 4.40 0.10 0.25*** 4.43 0.10 
AGE 50-64 0.38*** 5.60 0.15 0.35*** 4.63 0.14 0.34*** 4.48 0.13 
AGE 65+ 0.69*** 6.58 0.27 0.70*** 6.18 0.27 0.68*** 5.91 0.27 
 
GENDER (women) 0.26*** 5.10 0.10 0.27*** 4.76 0.11 0.28*** 4.85 0.11 
c) Marital Status          
MARRIED 0.14** 2.25 0.05 0.20*** 3.02 0.08 0.22*** 3.23 0.08 
LIVING TOGETHER -0.22** -2.20 -0.09 -0.11 -1.03 -0.04 -0.10 -0.98 -0.04 
DIVORCED 0.10 0.88 0.04 0.12 1.02 0.05 0.10 0.88 0.04 
SEPARATED 0.08 0.58 0.03 0.20 1.27 0.08 0.19 1.18 0.07 
WIDOWED 0.26** 2.20 0.10 0.20 1.48 0.08 0.19 1.43 0.07 
d) Economic Variable          
INCOME       -0.02 -1.60 -0.01 
e) Occupational Status          
PART TIME EMPLOYED 0.05 0.68 0.02 0.12 1.47 0.05 0.10 1.20 0.04 
SELF-EMPLOYED 0.11 0.55 0.04 0.11 0.59 0.04 0.12 0.64 0.05 
UNEMPLOYED 0.15* 1.75 0.06 0.10 1.05 0.04 0.05 0.53 0.02 
AT HOME 0.10 1.47 0.04 0.08 1.07 0.03 0.05 0.60 0.02 
STUDENT 0.07 0.65 0.03 0.10 0.81 0.04 0.06 0.52 0.02 
RETIRED 0.19** 2.10 0.08 0.19* 1.91 0.07 0.15 1.45 0.06 
OTHER 0.17 1.00 0.07 0.29* 1.68 0.11 0.24 1.37 0.09 
f) Trust           
TRUST IN LEGAL SYSTEM 0.16*** 5.90 0.06 0.15*** 5.16 0.06 0.15*** 5.17 0.06 
TRUST IN PARLIAMENT          
g) Religiosity          
RELIGIOUS 0.20*** 5.75 0.08 0.20*** 5.29 0.08 0.19*** 5.22 0.08 
h) Time          
YEAR (1995) 0.48*** 9.54 0.19 0.49*** 8.28 0.19 0.50*** 9.38 0.19 
          
Observations 2970   2489   2489   
Prob(LM-statistic)  0.00     0.00     0.00     
Notes: Dependent variable: tax morale on a four-point scale. The reference groups for each category of 
independent variable are: AGE 16-29, MEN, SINGLE, FULL-TIME EMPLOYED, and YEAR 1981. 
Significance levels: * 0.05 < p < 0.10, ** 0.01< p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Marginal effect = highest tax morale 
score (3). Coefficients are standardised. Estimations with another weighting variable as in Tables 1a, 1b, 2a, 
and 2b: original weight variable was multiplied by a constant for each survey, in order to produce an equal 
weighted N (number of participants) for each survey. 
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Table 3b: Ordered probit analysis continued exploring changes in tax morale between 
1981 & 1995 
 
 Weighted ordered probit 
Model 
12   
Model 
13   
Model 
14   
Independent Variables Coeff. z-Stat. Marg. Coeff. z-Stat. Marg. Coeff. z-Stat. Marg. 
a) Tax Rate          
INDIV. TAX RATE     -0.02 -0.08 -0.01    
b) Demographic Factors          
AGE 30-49 0.23*** 4.46 0.09 0.23*** 4.22 0.09 0.24*** 4.25 0.09 
AGE 50-64 0.38*** 5.68 0.15 0.35*** 4.69 0.14 0.34*** 4.52 0.13 
AGE 65+ 0.67*** 6.42 0.26 0.68*** 5.99 0.27 0.66*** 5.69 0.26 
 
GENDER (women) 0.28*** 5.46 0.11 0.29*** 5.10 0.11 0.297*** 5.20 0.12 
c) Marital Status          
MARRIED 0.12** 1.96 0.05 0.18*** 2.75 0.07 0.20*** 2.99 0.08 
LIVING TOGETHER -0.23** -2.25 -0.09 -0.12 -1.16 -0.05 -0.12 -1.11 -0.05 
DIVORCED 0.04 0.38 0.02 0.08 0.71 0.03 0.07 0.56 0.03 
SEPARATED 0.05 0.31 0.02 0.16 1.00 0.06 0.14 0.89 0.06 
WIDOWED 0.29** 2.42 0.11 0.22* 1.65 0.09 0.21 1.60 0.08 
d) Economic Variable          
INCOME       -0.02*** -1.75 -0.01 
e) Occupational Status          
PART TIME EMPLOYED 0.05 0.72 0.02 0.12 1.51 0.05 0.10 1.22 0.04 
SELF-EMPLOYED 0.08 0.41 0.03 0.08 0.39 0.03 0.09 0.45 0.04 
UNEMPLOYED 0.14 1.57 0.05 0.07 0.80 0.03 0.02 0.24 0.01 
AT HOME 0.11 1.62 0.04 0.09 1.26 0.04 0.06 0.73 0.02 
STUDENT 0.06 0.61 0.03 0.10 0.88 0.04 0.06 0.55 0.03 
RETIRED 0.18* 1.94 0.07 0.18* 1.79 0.07 0.13 1.28 0.05 
OTHER 0.20 1.12 0.08 0.32* 1.73 0.13 0.27 1.43 0.11 
f) Trust           
TRUST IN LEGAL SYSTEM          
TRUST IN PARLIAMENT  0.10*** 3.92 0.04 0.11*** 3.64 0.04 0.11*** 3.78 0.04 
g) Religiosity          
RELIGIOUS 0.20*** 5.88 0.08 0.20*** 5.43 0.08 0.20*** 5.35 0.08 
h) Time          
YEAR (1995) 0.46*** 9.14 0.18 0.48*** 7.91 0.19 0.48*** 9.06 0.19 
          
Observations 2963   2486   2486   
Prob(LM-statistic) 0.00     0.00     0.00     
Notes: Dependent variable: tax morale on a four-point scale. The reference groups for each category of 
independent variable are: AGE 16-29, MEN, SINGLE, FULL-TIME EMPLOYED, and YEAR 1981. 
Significance levels: * 0.05 < p < 0.10, ** 0.01< p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Marginal effect = highest tax morale 
score (3). Coefficients are standardised. Estimations with another weighting variable as in Tables 1a, 1b, 2a, 
and 2b: original weight variable was multiplied by a constant for each survey, in order to produce an equal 
weighted N (number of participants) for each survey. 
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The main finding of interest, after controlling for numerous variables, is that tax morale in 
Australia was significantly higher in 1995 than in 1981. This can be seen by examining the 
regression coefficients for the TIME variable. Here it can be seen that TIME has a positive 
relationship with tax morale, indicating that in 1995, tax morale scores were higher than in 
1981. In other words, tax morale in Australia appears to have increased significantly over 
time. The marginal effects are particularly high, showing values around 19 percentage 
points. All the variables that were found to predict tax morale in Tables 1a, 1b, 2a, and 2b 
were also found to predict tax morale in Tables 3a and 3b. Possible explanations for why 
tax morale may have increased in Australia between 1981 and 1995 will be discussed in 
Section V. 
 
4.1.4 A comparison of tax morale across time for 21 OECD countries 
 
The analysis presented in the previous section indicates that tax morale in Australia 
increased significantly between 1981 and 1995. The question that arises from such a 
finding is whether the observed increase in tax morale in Australia is a general 
international tendency.  
 
So far only one study (apart from this one) has investigated how tax morale has changed 
across time in different countries (Torgler, 2001b). Torgler’s study, however, only 
investigated changes in tax morale among developing countries. Given there are significant 
cultural differences, as well as governmental differences, between developed and 
developing countries, it would be unwise to compare tax morale values among regions 
with a different economic and institutional level. For example, it could be the case that tax 
evasion might be considered justifiable by the majority of citizens in some developing 
countries, while we know this is not the case for Australia. Further, there might even be a 
moral duty for citizens in some developing countries not to pay their taxes (see Torgler, 
2001b). Hence, for our purposes, it would be more appropriate to make comparisons with 
countries more similar to our own. 
 
The aim of this section, therefore, is to provide a comparison of Australia’s tax morale 
levels to those of 20 other OECD countries. It is important to do this for two reasons. First, 
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from the findings presented so far it is unclear whether tax morale in Australia was 
substantially lower or higher in 1981 or 1995 than in any other OECD country. Second, the 
increase in tax morale in Australia between 1981 and 1995 may be unique to Australia and 
may not be shared by other developed countries. Table 4 presents a basic descriptive 
analysis showing the percentage of individuals in each OECD country saying that ‘tax 
evasion is never justifiable’ (that is, those with the highest level of tax morale). Table 4 
also presents the mean level of tax morale in Australia in relation to 20 other OECD 
countries. 
 
First of all, it can be seen that in 1981 the average number of people among all OECD 
countries saying that tax evasion was never justified was 56 per cent. This increased to 60 
per cent in 1995. Further the average score obtained for the tax morale question across all 
OECD countries was 1.93 (out of 3). This increased to 2.12 in 1995. While there have been 
some countries in the OECD who have had decreases in tax morale over time (for example, 
Sweden, Germany, Italy, Switzerland, Great Britain, Canada and Belgium), in general, it 
appears that tax morale among the OECD countries has increased slightly over time.  
 
When comparing the Australian figures to those of the rest of the OECD, it can be seen in 
Table 4 that Australia’s level of tax morale in 1981 (48%) was substantially below the 
OECD average (56%). However, in 1995 Australia’s level of tax morale (62%) was 
slightly above the OECD average (60%), suggesting that tax morale in Australia changed 
substantially more than average than tax morale in other OECD countries. Possible 
explanations for why tax morale in Australia may have increased significantly over this 
time will be discussed in the following section. 
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Table 4: Tax morale levels among OECD Countries as assessed by the 1981, 1990 and 
1995 World Values Surveys 
 
Country  Year  
Percentage 
of 
respondents 
stating tax 
evasion is 
never 
justified 
Mean 
score on 
tax morale 
question  Year 
Percentage of 
respondents 
stating tax 
evasion is 
never justified
Mean 
score on 
tax 
morale 
question  Year 
Percentage of 
respondents 
stating tax 
evasion is 
never justified 
Mean 
score on 
tax 
morale 
question
Austria    1990 62.3 2.26    
Australia 1981 47.7 1.72    1995 62.1 2.18 
Belgium 1981 43.3 1.58 1990 33.9 1.28    
Canada 1981 66.9 2.17 1990 59.2 2.08    
Denmark 1981 58.5 2.10 1990 57.3 2.03    
Finland 1981 58.7 2.11 1990 40.3 1.64 1996 57.4 2.01 
France 1981 48.9 1.58 1990 46.5 1.69    
Germany* 1981 52.7 1.83 1990 53.8 2.00 1997 46.9 1.76 
Great 
Britain 1981 58.2 1.87 1990 53.9 1.94    
Iceland 1981 56.9 1.96 1990 56 2.00    
Ireland 1981 38.5 1.55 1990 48.8 1.80    
Italy 1981 52.8 2.41 1990 69.7 1.97    
Northern 
Ireland 1981 74.7 1.86 1990 55.2 2.25    
Japan 1981 81.8 2.60 1990 81.9 2.64 1995 80.6 2.62 
Netherlands 1981 37.9 1.53 1990 42.9 1.66    
Norway 1982 40.3 1.48 1990 43.1 1.64 1996 47.5 1.83 
Portugal    1990 39.9 1.46    
Spain 1981 49.9 1.78 1990 58.4 1.96 1995 69.5 2.33 
Sweden 1982 68.8 2.41 1990 56.4 2.01 1996 49.3 1.87 
Switzerland    
1988-
1989 63.8 2.08 1996 53.5 1.95 
USA 1982 67.0 2.22 1990 66.7 2.31 1995 73.6 2.48 
Average   55.8 1.93   54.5 1.94   60.0 2.12 
* The 1981 value of Germany considers only West Germany.  
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V. Possible explanations and their implications 
 
There could be any number of possible reasons that could be given to explain why tax 
morale may have increased in Australia between 1981 and 1995. While this fact is 
acknowledged here, only three possible explanations are offered below.  
 
5.1. Australia’s 1985 tax reforms 
 
In her book on the history of Australian taxation, Julie Smith (1993) discussed how in the 
early 1980s, the Government was facing numerous complaints about the existing income 
tax system. There was the perception among the public that many were not meeting their 
taxation obligations and it was clear that taxpayer compliance had eroded. ‘Tax avoision 
was also contributing to public resentment towards the existing and highly visible income 
tax burden’ (Smith, 1993, p. 111). For example, during the late 1970s, the scandalous 
‘bottom of the harbour’ schemes were being widely publicized. Here, company profits 
were being stripped before they could be taxed and the records conveniently lost (Levi, 
1988). The more widespread the knowledge that others were not paying their share, the 
more non-compliance increased. As a result, the income tax base was shrinking. These 
could be some of the reasons why tax morale was so low in Australia in 1981. 
 
Taxation issues therefore became prominent during the 1984 election campaign, and to 
tackle tax reform as a package the then Prime Minister, Bob Hawke, announced that there 
would be a Summit of Taxation Reform in 1985 to try to review the problem. Based on the 
Summit proceedings, the government announced a package of tax reforms in September 
1985 (for a detailed discussion see Smith, 1993). To list just a few, the reforms included 
introducing a capital gains tax and a fringe benefits tax, the company tax rate was raised to 
the top personal marginal tax rate, personal income tax rates were lowered, various 
industry concessions were abolished, the investment allowance was reduced slightly, gold 
profits became subject to taxation, and extravagant concessions to superannuation were 
curtailed. These reforms were slowly introduced over a period of several years. Given that 
taxation reform was such a prominent issue to taxpayers during the mid to late 1980s, and 
the reforms ‘substantially improved the fairness of the tax system at the time’ (Mathews, 
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1985, p. 424), it is proposed here that these two factors may have led to the increase in tax 
morale among Australians from 1981 to 1995.  
 
5.2. Self assessment 
 
In the 1986/87 financial year, the Tax Office introduced a self-assessment system to 
taxation. As discussed by D’Ascenzo and Poulakis (2002) the move to a self-assessment 
system came about following a Tax Office review of the effectiveness of its traditional 
system of assessing income tax returns. The Tax Office review concluded that the original 
assessment system was not cost effective and had little effect on taxpayer compliance.  
 
Under the self-assessment system, taxpayers are required to lodge a tax return containing 
detailed information and calculations of their taxable income. This system differs from the 
original system in that returns are no longer subjected to technical scrutiny, and the Tax 
Office takes all deductions and claims made in a tax return at face value. All onus of 
responsibility is therefore placed on the taxpayer to prepare an accurate return. Audit 
activity is then primarily used post-assessment to check the accuracy of some returns. 
Under Part IVA of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1936, the Tax Office then has up to six 
years8 in which to review the legitimacy of a claim and disallow it if they consider it to be 
illegitimate (D’Ascenzo & Poulakis, 2002).  
 
Not only is the self-assessment system of taxation a more cost effective system for the Tax 
Office, but if one reviews the literature on regulatory theory, such a system is what 
regulatory scholars call a self-regulatory system. Regulatory scholars (for example, Ayres 
& Braithwaite, 1992; Sparrow, 2000) consistently argue that if those being regulated are 
allowed to self-regulate themselves in the first instance, then this serves to improve their 
voluntary compliance in the long-term. This is because self-regulation is important for 
building and maintaining trust among regulators and regulatees. Several empirical studies 
have been able to show that trust can serve to nurture voluntary compliance (for example, 
Ayres & Braithwaite, 1992; Braithwaite & Makkai, 1994; Murphy, in press). Trust appears 
to be a resource like no other; it is not depleted through use but rather through lack of use 
                                                 
8 Longer in the case of blatant tax evasion. 
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(Gambetta, 1988). Hence, the more that regulatory interactions are based on trust, the more 
likely regulators such as the Tax Office should be able to nurture the development of 
reciprocal trust relationships. Of course, for such a system to be sustainable long-term, it 
also requires that a backup strategy be in place to detect and penalise those who may 
attempt to cheat the system (hence, the purpose of post-assessment audits and penalties for 
illegitimate returns).  
 
From the findings of the present study, we can also see that trust was an important factor in 
predicting the level of tax morale among Australians. The implication here is that if 
governments wish to improve taxpayers’ voluntary compliance with their taxation 
obligations then they will need to foster trust among those they regulate, which in turn 
should affect their tax morale. With the Tax Office’s move towards a more self-regulatory 
and trusting system of control in the mid to late 1980s, this strategy may have gone some 
way to increasing trust in the Tax Office and tax system, which in turn may have gone on 
to positively affect taxpayers’ level of tax morale.  
 
5.3. New Public Management 
 
A third possible explanation as to why tax morale may have increased in Australia between 
1981 and 1995 can be found in the management literature (for example, Hughes, 1994; 
Sparrow, 2000). The 1980s saw public administration being faced with growing state and 
public demands to become more market-focused, service oriented, open and efficient (Job 
& Honaker, 2003; Hughes, 1994). To respond to this, the Tax Office adopted a new 
organisational structure designed to make them more efficient and customer-focused. 
Instead of focussing so much on compliance management, risk control, or structuring the 
application of enforcement discretion, the Tax Office slowly became more focused on 
service, customers, quality, transparency and process improvement (see Job & Honaker, 
2003). In fact, the Tax Office was amongst the first tax administrations in the world to 
implement a new client-based organisational structure (the client based model is where 
staff are assigned to units that focus on specific groups of customers; for example, salary 
and wage earners, small business income taxpayers, and large business income tax 
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payers)9. One of the advantages of such a client-based structure is that it allows tax 
administrations to better match their enforcement and educational programmes to the 
compliance patterns of different groups (Vehorn & Brondolo, 1999). According to Verhorn 
and Brondolo (1999, p505), such a system has ‘the potential for delivering higher quality 
service to taxpayers and achieving high levels of compliance’. If taxpayers feel that such 
an approach is likely to achieve better compliance levels among other taxpayers, then this 
may go on to influence their own tax morale. Such a client-focused approach is also likely 
to increase trust among taxpayers, as taxpayers are more likely to feel that their needs are 
being considered in the regulatory process.  
 
VI. Concluding remarks and limitations 
 
Using data from two waves of the World Values Survey, the aim of the present study was 
to investigate the level of tax morale among Australian citizens between 1981 and 1995. 
Much of the previous research on tax morale has been conducted in Europe and Latin 
America so it was of interest to see whether Australians were high or low on this concept. 
It was also of interest to see what shaped tax morale in Australia and whether tax morale 
had changed over the period of investigation. Furthermore, it was also of interest to see 
how tax morale changed over time in Australia in comparison to other OECD countries.  
 
Like in previous international studies, a number of key variables were found to predict 
one’s level of tax morale in the present study. For example, trust was found to be an 
important predictor of tax morale. Those citizens who had higher levels of trust were also 
more likely to have higher levels of tax morale. Those whose sense of moral obligation 
was stronger (as measured through religiosity) were also found to be higher in tax morale. 
Analyses of the data also revealed a promising finding that tax morale had in fact increased 
in Australia between 1981 and 1995. Three plausible explanations for this increase were 
offered in the previous section.  
 
                                                 
9 Prior to this, a function-based structure was used by the Tax Office (for example, a separate division for 
processing tax returns, another for auditing taxpayers, and another for collecting areas).  
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While we do not know whether the increase in tax morale over time has equated to 
substantially higher levels of tax compliance in 1995 compared to 1981, what we can say 
from the data is that policy decisions made by the government over that time appear to 
have had a positive impact on Australian’s level of tax morale. However, in making this 
claim it should be noted that the present study certainly has had its limitations. First of all, 
the data contained within the World Values Survey are somewhat general in focus and as a 
result, attitudes and issues to do specifically with taxation do not figure highly. A survey 
designed specifically to explore issues surrounding tax morale may therefore prove fruitful 
in the future. Second, the possible explanations offered in the previous section for why tax 
morale may have increased in Australia between 1981 and 1995 have not been empirically 
tested. It could be the case that none of these suggestions would have held up under 
empirical testing or it could be the case that a number of alternative possibilities might 
explain the data better. The third limitation, or perhaps a suggestion for future research 
would be to measure attitudes to taxation both directly before and after a significant change 
to tax administration. By doing this, any change in attitude over time could be attributed 
specifically to that event (that is, unlike in the present study, there would be no question as 
to whether or not the event may have affected tax morale).  
 
Even with these limitations, however, it should be noted that this study has provided the 
first ever statistical analysis of tax morale in Australia, how it differs from other countries 
around the world, and how it has changed over time. As a result, it offers the reader an 
insight into how Australians’ attitudes towards taxation may have changed since 1981.  
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